3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

ED

4 October 1960

Copy No. C

7

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




DOBUMENT NO. 29

19 RHANGE IN CLASS. (X
1) PACLATEURD
SLAIS, GHANGED TO: TS 3 H
HENT PANEM DATE: 2010.
ANTE: NR TO 2

10 JUN 1980 HEVSEWER

TOP SECRET

proved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179286



Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179286

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 October 1960

DAILY BRIEF

*USSR-UN: The aggressive tone of Khrushchev's 3 October speech, intensifying his attack on the UN secretary general, but and his letter to the five neutralist leaders, in which he demanded condemnation of the RB-47 as well as the U-2 flight anxious to avoid any Minited Minister Macmillan's speech last week and the President's letter rejecting the neutralists' proposal. Despite private Soviet efforts to encourage expectations of a favorable reply to the neutralists' initiative, Khrushchev apparently chose to interpret the President's letter as an affront to his own prestige and that of the USSR which required a vigorous response. An additional factor in Khrushchev's reaction may have been his desire to maintain a strong anti-Western posture in anticipation of a world Communist meeting in Moscow in November, particularly in the light of Peiping's continuing intransigence on the key issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. (Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: An Iraqi military court has ordered the country's chief Communist newspaper, Ittihad al-Shab, to suspend publication for ten months. Ittihad was the official daily newspaper of the orthodox Communist party, which also published an English-language weekly version. The closing appears to be part of a general press crackdown in retaliation for articles critical of the Qasim regime, which still is trying to suppress both Communist and "nationalist" extremism. The Communists, however, are likely to be more damaged by this policy than are (Page 3) the "nationalists."

OK

i

TOP SECRET

Mali-Czechoslovakia: A special Czech mission arrived in Bamako on 30 September, and the early conclusion of trade and other agreements between the Mali Republic (former French Soudan) and Czechoslovakia appears likely. Mali officials are reported ready to sign a barter trade deal and to grant stopover rights for the recently established Czech air service to Guinea. (Mali's leftist interior minister -- a potenial rival for power of President Keita--may also ask the Czechs to provide small arms for the militia and police According to a recent report, last month the Czechs, while rehewing earlier economic overtures to the Soudanese, assured the provision of whatever arms Mali might require. (Page 4)

e sent of PI;

nd sent

venes 10 4

South Africa: The government of Prime Minister Verwoerd, whose Nationalist party has long been committed to the reconstruction of the Union of South Africa as a republic, is bringing the issue before the white electorate in a referendum on 5 October. A close contest is expected. A change in the Union's form of government would require the other members of the Commonwealth to pass on South Africa's continued membership. Several African and Asian members have warned that they would oppose this, thereby placing new (Page 5) strains on the Commonwealthx

014

*Republic of the Congo: No date has yet been set for the round-table political conference, and the outcome of the power struggle between Mobutu and Lumumba continues uncertain. Pro-Lumumba UAR troops of the UN Command, on orders from Cairo, have failed to implement a UN order for the rotation of elements of the UAR contingent from Leopoldville to the Congo part of the Leopoldinterior. ville contingent, which did leave the city on 1 October, was lown back the following day "without the UN's knowledge."

OK

Mobutu has stated that he is 'disgusted' with the present mpasse and "ready to give up." On 1 October he implied that le might "open parliament again and let the politicians fight it (Page 6) out themselves."

ii

DAILY BRIEF

*Laos: Captain Kong Le's paratroopers, allegedly supported by Pathet Lao elements, have resumed their offensive against General Phoumi's forces southeast of Paksane in central Laos,

Such action, which violates the cease-fire agreed to in Luang Prabang on 28 September, was threatened by Kong Le in a recent press conference. Premier Souvanna Phouma, meanwhile, appears to be stalling over the King's bid for political talks in Luang Prabang. It is doubtful, however, that he authorized Kong Le's apparent resumption of hostilities.

(Page 7)

OK delete

iii

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179286

Khrushchev Intensifies Attack on UN Secretary General And Rejects Meeting With President

In his third statement before the UN General Assembly Premier Khrushchev on 3 October maintained his aggressive tone by renewing his attacks on Secretary General Hammarsk-jold and, in effect, rejecting the neutralists' proposal that he meet with President Eisenhower. In his formal reply to the five neutralist leaders Khrushchev reportedly avoided an outright rejection but reverted to his demand that the US condemn the U-2 flight, adding the RB-47 incident as well, as preconditions for a meeting.

Khrushchev and the President,		
Khrushchev had obtained "approval"		
for a meeting from Moscow. Khrushchev probably believed,		
however, that even an ambiguous response to the neutralist		
proposal would have implied a retreat from the position he		
took in Paris and would have been interpreted as a sign of weak-		
ness in light of Macmillan's pointed rebuttal of Khrushchev's views		
and President Eisenhower's letter to the five neutral leaders.		
The Soviet leader apparently chose to regard the President's		
letter turning down the meeting as an affront to his own pres-		
tige and that of the USSR, and felt it required a vigorous reply.		

Following Nasir's speech calling for a meeting between

The Soviet leader's failure to align himself with the neutralist initiative also indicates that he feels compelled to pursue an uncompromising line toward the West until after the US elections. Khrushchev probably concluded that any acknowlegment of the possibility of resuming neogtiations now would have blunted his indictment of the Western powers at this UN session.

Khrushchev also broadened his attack on Hammarskjold to include a direct call for his resignation and threatened to withhold Soviet cooperation with future UN decisions. The renewed assault may have been intended as a reply to the President's call for Soviet action in the UN which could pave the way for negotiations.

An additional factor in Khrushchev's rebuff of the neutralist leaders' proposal may have been the apparent failure of a

SECRET	

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179286

high-level Soviet mission to pected to increase his incent Western posture in anticipating in Moscow in November. apparently prepared to argue Soviet party is giving "aid as shchev would want to avert as possible. The collapse of with regard to negotiating with opportunity to emphasize the perialists" was the correct sire to reduce his vulnerabiline of attack.	cive to maintain a sign of the world Co With the Chinese as forcibly as produced comfort to the ease many areas of ease Khrushchev's predict the United State at its analysis of the one. Khrushchev we	strong anti- communist meet- Communists eviously that the enemy," Khru- expected criticism -summit policies es gave Peiping an ee "aims of the im- evould probably de-

TOP SECRET

Qasim Regime Cracks Down on Iraqi Press

Iraq's chief Communist newspaper, Ittihad al-Shab, has been ordered suspended for ten months by an Iraqi military court, ostensibly for commenting on a trial while it was before the court. Al-Thawra, one of the largest anti-Communist dailies, was suspended for a like period at the same time. Ittihad al-Shab was the official newspaper of the orthodox Communist party and had a daily circulation of nearly 15,000, large by Iraqi standards. It also published Iraqi Review, an English-language weekly version, which apparently will also succumb.

In late August Governor General Abdi admonished the press to refrain from extremism and criticism of the regime. However, this warning was largely ignored, and several other papers were suspended. Included among these were two anti-Communist organs and one pro-Communist. Another pro-Communist paper which had been shut down previously was allowed to reappear in late September.

The closures of Ittihad and al-Thawra are the government's severest blows against the press. Qasim is reported to have ordered the release of the papers' editors, who were sentenced to jail at the same time. There are indications that Qasim's campaign against irresponsibility in the press may result in the shutdown of all Communist-line and violently nationalist papers, leaving a number of moderate nationalist ones to dominate the field. This appears to be in line with Qasim's present policy of cracking down on all extremism, from either right or left.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mali-Czech Ties Developing

The Mali Republic (former French Soudan), which proclaimed its sovereignty on 22 September, appears to be moving toward the early conclusion of trade and other agreements with Czechoslovakia. Such arrangements, which presumably would include the establishment of diplomatic relations, would be in line with the publicly expressed intentions of Mali leaders to cooperate with all friendly countries and accept help from "all sources." (Privately, however, President Modibo Keita and other moderate officials have expressed a strong desire to avoid becoming dependent on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

A Czech mission headed by Vice Interior Minister Klima arrived in Bamako on 30 September from Conakry for talks with Mali officials.

Mali officials planned to indicate to the Czech delegation their readiness to sign a barter-trade deal providing for an exchange of peanuts--Mali's chief export item-for Czech industrial equipment and to grant stopover rights for the recently established Czech air service to Guinea. Mali's Interior Minister Madeira Keita--leader of an extremist faction in the Mali regime--was said to be considering asking the Czechs to provide small arms for the militia and police, both of which are under his control. He may also have in mind a request for personnel to train these internal security forces--a function the Czechs have been performing in Guinea since early 1959. Madeira Keita returned with the Czech delegation from a visit he had just concluded in Conakry.

The arrival of the Czechs follows closely the appearance in Moscow and Prague last month of a special exploratory mission from the Bamako regime. At that time Czech authorities reportedly proposed a barter agreement and also gave assurances that Czechoslovakia could provide whatever arms Mali might require. In early June a Czech commercial representative who visited Dakar as the guest of the now-dissolved Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan urged the conclusion of a barter-trade agreement and a technical assistance program.

SECRET

South African Referendum on Establishment of a Republic

The government of Prime Minister Verwoerd, whose Nationalist party has long been committed to the reconstitution of South Africa as a republic, is bringing the issue before the white electorate in a referendum on 5 October. Both the Afrikaner community -- the backbone of support for Verwoerd and the Nationalists -- and the English-speaking opposition have conducted strenuous campaigns, and the total vote is expected to reach 1,700,000--more than 90 percent of those registered. Recent polls indicate that at least 80,000 voters are still undecided, and the vote could go either way. Ultimate responsibility for the change rests with the South African parliament, where Verwoerd commands a majority of two-to-one.

A change in government structure would raise the question of South Africa's relationship to the Commonwealth, since the other members would be required to pass on its continued membership. Several African and Asian nations--notably Ghana and Malaya -- are vocal in their opposition to the Union's racial policies. London would probably seek to prevent South Africa's expulsion because of the additional strain such a move would impose on the Commonwealth.

A loss of membership would eventually mean exclusion from the Commonwealth preference system, from which several South African industries benefit to the extent of about \$14,000,000 a year. Verwoerd has nevertheless indicated that his government will "proceed with" the establishment of a republic regardless of Commonwealth disapproval.

The Situation in the Congo

No date has been set for the round-table political conference of Congolese leaders, and the outcome of the power struggle between Mobutu and Lumumba continues uncertain. Katanga President Tshombé has stated his unwillingness to attend such a conference, and other politicians may follow his lead if Lumumba continues to insist on attending the conference in the capacity of premier. Mobutu has stated that he is "disgusted" with the present impasse and "ready to give up." On 1 October he threatened to "open parliament again and let the politicians fight it out themselves."

Lumumba, in an outspoken attack against the United States, charged on 2 October that "US representatives" had attempted to obtain concessions to exploit the Congo's natural resources, but that he had refused to give his consent "behind parliament's back." He added that the United States was seeking to overthrow him because it feared that he would sell uranium to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the small detachment of UAR troops in Leopoldville has been ordered by Cairo to ignore a UN order to rejoin the UAR battalion in Gemena in Equateur Province. Although one company was flown to Gemena on the morning of 30 September, Cairo instructed that the remaining UAR forces were to remain in Leopoldville pending further orders.

the transfer had been unilaterally suspended, and that the UAR commander had been able to secure "without the UN's knowledge" the return of the company flown earlier to Gemena. UAR troops control the Leopoldville airport area.

Although the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea continue to regard their troops in the Leopoldville area as a potential asset to Lumumba in the current power struggle. Cairo appears disturbed by Lumumba's 27 September request for large-scale military aid, including arms for from ten to fifteen thousand men. The UAR ambassador has characterized Lumumba's request as "without foundation or knowledge" and urged that Cairo initiate a technical committee to study the Congo's needs.

TOP SECRET

Α	pproved f	or Release:	2020/03/13	C03179286
	TUP	SECKE	T	

The A	Cituation	in Laos
1116	DILUALIUN	l III LIAUS

Captain Kong Le's paratroopers and other elements from the Vientiane garrison have resumed their offensive against Phoumi's forces southeast of Paksane in central Laos. Kong Le himself is said to have arrived in the area on 2 October. Pathet Lao forces are also alleged to be supporting the new offensive and engaging in road repair work. General Bounleut has reportedly come up to Thakhek, some 50 miles north of Savannakhet, to supervise defense of the area for Phoumi. If attacks by Kong Le's forces continue, Savannakhet plans to instruct a sabotage group, presumably based across the river in Thailand, to resume harassment activities against Vientiane. Continued attacks by Kong Le may also galvanize Thai Premier Sarit into more active support of Phoumi. He is reliably reported to be upset by Phoumi's reverses and considering giving him financial help.

Kong Le on 30 September publicly denounced the cease-fire agreement reached in Luang Prabang on 28 September and threatened to continue to move against Phoumi until he had captured Savannakhet. The minister of finance in Souvanna Phouma's government is reliably reported to have stated that Souvanna told Kong Le to stop fighting on 1 October, but that the latter continues to do as he pleases. He described Kong Le as completely out of control.

Kong Le was extremely incensed over the King's failure to invite him to the military commanders' conference which led to the cease-fire.

Souvanna, meanwhile, appears to be trying to delay commencement of the political consultations under the King's aegis which are intended to lead to formation of a new government of national unity. In response to an apparent summons by the King to come to Luang Prabang for immediate talks, Souvanna pleaded that he was too busy in Vientiane and would be unable to come up to the royal capital until the end of the week. The premier clearly feels his fortunes are improving and is maneuvering for further time in the hopes that his position will become so strong that the King will feel himself unable to ask him to resign. It is doubtful, however, that Souvanna authorized Kong Le's apparent resumption of hostilities.

TOP SECRET

The situation in Sam Neua Province remains confused and the subject of conflicting reports. Souvanna was to have dispatched two of his ministers to the area on 3 October to look into the situation.	
the pro-Phoumi garrison which abandoned Sam Neua town on 28 September had "joined the Pathet Lao." the Pathet Lao had disarmed the force, believed to number about 1,000 men, and was bringing them to Sam Neua. The Pathet Lao had also requested "liaison" with a delegation composed of "a representative of Captain Kong Le and a representative of the royal army." This information, if true, tends to bely Souvanna's easy assumption that establishment of the government's control merely requires the dispatch of "administrators." Possession of the arms taken from the surrendered	
Phoumi force would also substantially enhance the Pathet Lao's capabilities in the area.	

TOP SECRET

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03179286

